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II. PUBLIC LAW
Melvin G. Dakin*
TAXATION
State Inheritance Tax-Federal Estate Tax Not Accorded Status of
Debt
Since the decision in the Succession of Gheems in 1921,1 no con-
tax, to the impact of the federal estate tax on the same transfer of
sideration has been given, in the imposition of the state inheritance
interests; in other words no deduction has been permitted for such
taxes in arriving at the amount of the various portions of the estate
to be subjected to state inheritance tax. Where, as in the Succession
of Henderson,' decided at the last term of court, the testator had
made no provision for the apportionment of the tax among the
various legatees,3 the result was to impose a very heavy tax burden
upon the recipient of the residue of the estate. The taxpayer sought
to lighten his burden by claiming the status of a debt, to be deducted
in computing the taxable net estate for state purposes, for the federal
estate taxes chargeable against him as residuary legatee.
The supreme court found no basis for overruling or distinguish-
ing the Gheems case and upheld the tax collector; it reviewed the
legislative history of the inheritance tax prior and subsequent to the
Gheems case and also alluded to the similar position taken by other
state courts in considering the issue. The court found neither of
the taxpayer's major arguments for overruling the Gheems case
persuasive. It could find no solid ground for characterizing, as the
taxpayer urged, the federal tax as a tax on the estate as left by the
testator and the state tax as a tax on the recipients of such estate;
citing Knowlton v. Moore,4 state and federal taxes were both char-
acterized as transfer or death taxes indistinguishable in their impact
upon the estate and from their nature furnishing no basis for deduct-
ing the federal tax from the net estate prior to assessment of the
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.,.
1. 148 La. 1017, 88 So. 253, 16 A.L.R. 685 (1921).
2. 211 La. 707, 80 So. (2d) 809 (1947).
3. As noted in the opinion, some states have adopted legislation providing
for apportionment of the federal estate tax unless the testator provides to the
contrary and such legislation has been upheld as not in conflict with federal
estate tax statutes. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95, 63 S. Ct. 109, 87 L. Ed.
106, 142 A. L. R. 1131 (1942).
4. 178 U. S. 41, 55, 56, 20 S. Ct. 747, 753, 44 L. Ed. 969 (1900).
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state tax. Secondly, rather than resulting in a tax on a tax as the
taxpayer argued, the federal and state taxes were held to constitute
companion claims on the net estate transmitted from the testator to
his legatees, each imposed without regard to the other.5
The court did not have occasion to consider the relationship
of the state estate tax to the problem but the existence of that statute'
would appear to furnish an additional cogent basis for reaching the
decision which it did. That statute seeks to take advantage of the
provision in the federal estate tax legislation granting a credit of
eighty per cent of the federal basic estate taxes for death taxes paid
to the states.? Specifically, the Louisiana statute provides that if the
aggregate of all state death taxes actually paid to the several states
(including Louisiana) should prove to be less than eighty per cent
of the, federal basic estate tax, a transfer tax to the extent of any
such difference shall become payable to the state.'
The adoption of this estate transfer tax by the legislature sub-
sequent to the adoption of the inheritance tax legislation would
seem to indicate an intention on their part to impose death taxes
which; together with death taxes imposed by other states, would,
as a minimum, equal the eighty per cent federal estate tax credit.
In this statutory pattern, any reduction of state taxes through reduc-
tion of the net estate by federal estate taxes could be helpful to the
taxpayer only if the total of all state death taxes was in excess of
the credit and would not be reduced below the amount of the credit
by taking the federal tax as a deduction'. IA the light of the com-
plexities and inequalities which appear to be involved in such a
procedure, it is difficult to believe that the legislature would have
intended the deduction as urged by the taxpayer without making
specific provision therefor.'
5. Citing Prick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 478, 45 S. Ct. 608, 69 L. Ed. 105.
42 A.L. It. 316 (1925).
6. La. Act 119 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1989) §§ 8581-8586].
7. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A. § 881 (b).
8. La. Act 119 of 1982,,§ 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8582]. In practice the
full amount of such additiona tax is not always collected because the inheritance
tax has been fixed and the succession closed prior to a final determination being
made with respect to the federal estate tax. If the federal estate tax as estimated
is liter increased and the amount of the eighty per cent credit likewise increased,
the succession is ordinarily not reopened to assess an additional state tax. The
taxpayer reaps no benefit therefrom, however, since the credit is allowed only if
state taxes have actually been paid. Absent such payment, the portion of the
federal tax which should have come to the state must be paid to the federal gov-
ernment. See comment on this subject in the Preliminary Report of the Louisiana
Revenue Code Commission, (1946) 116-120.
9. For a discussion of the complexities involved in those states where deduc-
tion of the federal estate tax is permitted for inheritance tax purposes and an
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State Inheritance Tax-War Savings Bonds Designating
Beneficiary at Death Subject Thereto
The transfer of United States War Savings Bonds to a registered
co-owner upon the death of the other co-owner was held subject
to state inheritance taxes by a unanimous court in Succession of
Raborn, ° thus terminating the authority of the rule on the matter
announced by the First Circuit of Appeal in Succession of Tanner1
a year earlier. The Raborn decision was based to a substantial extent
on a treasury circular 2 specifically subjecting such bonds to state
inheritance taxation which circular, it was noted, had not been con-
sidered by the circuit court in deciding the Tanner case. Since the
Raborn case involved a bequest of bonds registered in the name of
decedent, but payable to a sister in the event of death, and the Tanner
case involved the disposition, as between the community and the
wife's separate estate, of bonds registered in the name of the husband
and wife as co-owners, all of the reasoning advanced in the latter
case was not up for re-examination in the Raborn case. The Tanner
decision was rested on the proposition that the bonds constituted a
contract between the United States and the purchaser and that the
rights of survivors arose solely from such federal contract. Hence,
the argument ran, state laws with respect to the devolution of such
property were rendered inoperative as being in conflict with para-
mount federal law on the subject." An analogy was drawn in the
Tanner case, for example, between the purchase of bonds registered
in the name of the husband and wife out of community funds and
the purchase of a life insurance contract in favor of the wife with
such community funds, in which latter case the proceeds have been
held to be the separate property of the wife.' 4 Justice Ott, dissenting
in the Tanner case, expressed disapproval of that analogy and any
extension of the doctrine of the insurance cases because of the excep-
tions thus created to the presumption as to the community status
of property which both the husband and wife reciprocally possess
at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. 5 However, Justice
estate transfer tax is also levied, see Prentice-Hall, 3 Federal Tax Service 23,
210 (1945). Resort apparently must be had to the use of algebraic simultaneous
equations since the federal tax must be known to determine the state tax and
vice versa.
10. 210 La. 1038, 29 So. (2d) 53 (1946).
11. 24 So. (2d) 64.2 (La. App. 1946).
12. Treas. Cir. 654.
13. For a discussion and documentation of this rationale, see Note (1946)
20 Tulane L. Rev. 589.
14. Succession of Desforges, 135 La. 49, 64 So. 978, 52 L. R. A. (N. S)' 689
(1914).
15. 24 So. (2d) 642, 648 (La. App. 1946).
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Ott rejected the rationale of the majority opinion basically on the
ground that treasury regulations dealing with the matter of the
right to receive payment on bonds registered in the names of co-
owners, or providing for disposition of the proceeds in the event of
the death of the registered owner, were wholly directed to facili-
tating the transfer and redemption of the bonds and to relieving
the government from resort to legal proceedings to determine the
person entitled to receive the proceeds; to attribute to such regula-
tions affects on the taxable status of transfers under state inheritance
tax laws was in his view to go substantially beyond their intend-
ment.
In the face of the regulation specifically permitting the levy of
state taxes on the transfer of such bonds, there is probably little
likelihood that an opportunity will be presented to pass squarely
on all aspects of the Tanner case; should it be presented, however,
the persuasive analysis by Justice Ott will undoubtedly receive the
careful consideration of the court.
Parochial and Municipal Taxing Power-Requirement
of Separation
The need for legislative or constitutional clarification of parish-
municipal relations with respect to the building and maintenance
of streets and highways was underscored by the decision of the
supreme court on rehearing in State ex rel. Town of Bossier City
v. Padgett, Sheriff." Proceeding under Act 24 of 1870, the town
sought to recover from the parish tax collector the portion of the
proceeds of a special parish road tax which resulted from the im-
position of the levy on property located within the town. The 1870
statute provided that "when the police jury, or other parish author-
ity of any parish in which there is a municipal corporation or cor-
porations, shall cause to be assessed and collected a tax for road
purposes, the amount of tax so collected from property situated
within the limits of said municipal corporation, less the expense of
collecting the same, shall be paid over by the collector of parish
taxes to the treasurer of said corporation, and the authorities of said
municipal corporation shall expend the said fund for the purpose
of making or repairing the roads, streets or bridges of said municipal
corporation."17
16. 211 La. 603, 30 So. (2d) 555 (1946).
17. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3653.
[Vol. Vill
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The parish police jury intervened in the proceeding alleging
that the statute had been rendered inoperative by virtue of subse-
quent constitutional amendments and legislation designed to equal-
ize parochial and municipal taxes by other means and otherwise
to protect property owners within municipal corporations from
excessive taxation by parish police juries; the police jury also made
general allegations as to the unconstitutionality of the statute. Speci-
fically, counsel for the police jury argued that Section 8 of Article
XIV of the Constitution limited the parish in making a general
parochial levy to the imposition of one-half such levy on property
located within municipal corporations having in excess of one thou-
sands inhabitants and which provide and maintain systems of street
paving. Further, it was argued, the statute was rendered inopera-
tive by virtue of Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution which
authorizes the levy by the police jury of special taxes for public im-
provement provided such taxes have been approved by a majority
of the taxpayers of the district. On first hearing the court found
Section 8 of Article XIV inapplicable since limited to general paro-
chial taxes, found the statute not inconsistent with Section 10 of
Article X since it merely provided for the disposition of a special
tax levied pursuant to such authority by the parish, and ruled that
the statute should be given effect by transfer of the funds in ques-
tion from the parish tax collector to the town.'" The decision as
thus rendered appeared to reach a result with respect to special road
taxes which synchronized well with the equalization procedure re-
quired under the Constitution in the case of general parochial
taxes;1" in the case of special road taxes a requirement that the
portion of such taxes levied within a municipal corporation be
turned over to such corporation, and in the case of general parochial
taxes a limitation on the parish to imposition of one-half the general
parochial levy within a muncipal corporation maintaining a system
of street paving.
But for the diligence of counsel for the police jury the matter
might have rested there. However, further research disclosed that
in 1895 the court had decided the case of the State ex rel. Town of
Mansfield v. Police Jury of De Soto Parish2 ° under the 1879 counter-
part2' of what is now Section 5 of Article X of the Constitution and
that section as interpreted in the Mansfield case rendered unconsti-
18. 211 La. 608, 610-611, 80 So. (2d) 555, 557-558 (1946).
19. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 8.
20. 47 La. Ann. 1244, 17 So. 792 (1895).
21. La. Const. of 1879, Art. 202.
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tutional any such joint taxing procedure as contemplated in Act 24
of 1870. The section provides that "parochial and municipal corpor-
ations and public boards may exercise the power of taxation, subject
to such limitations as may be elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion, under authority granted to them by the Legislature for parish,
municipal and local purposes, strictly public in their nature. The
provisions of this section shall not apply to, nor affect, similar grants
to such political subdivisions under other sections of this Constitu-
tion which are self-operative." From these seemingly very general
grants of taxing power to parishe6 and municipalities the 1895 court
had extracted the proposition that the legislature could not authorize
the parish to exercise its taxing power for the benefit of a municipal
corporation within its limits nor could it authorize the converse.
1 his, it said, was the plain and unambiguous meaning of the pro-
, ision and such was the meaning accepted on rehearing by the court
.n the Bossier City case. Under the decision, it appears necessary
for the legislature to enact a legislative counterpart of the constitu-
tional limitation on the imposition of general parochial taxes
applicable to the levy of special road taxes; otherwise the protection
afforded by that limitation can be readily nullified by the imposition
of a special road tax.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Challenges of School Bond Elections
Louisiana has its complement of legislation protective of the
buyers of municipal bonds in the way of presumptions of the truth
of recitals of regularity contained therein, prescription of the bring-
ing of contests to test validity of bond issues or the elections or tax
provisions underlying them, and other devices. Nonetheless, bond
counsel, sensitive to the gossamer technicalities which have often
I.ufficed to invalidate issues in the past, persist in bringing to the
supreme court for final settlement new questions as to whether real
or fancied irregularities are safely within the ambit of that sphere
of "regularity, formality, and legality" the validity of which cannot
be qucstioned after Lhe elapse of the sixty day prescriptive period
provikd l:y the Con: ritutiol.
22
h , .,istitu-i*al limitation of sixty days from the date of
';itin2 the results of an election for bringing actions attack-
i c validity of such election, or the tax provisions or bond
2'Z. 1,n. ConSt. of 1921, Art. XIV, § 14(n).
[Vol. VIII
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authorization considered in such election, was applied in two addi-
tional cases during the 1946-1947 term.23 The first attack was based
on the ground that a school board ordinance recreating the school
district and decreasing its area erroneously described the area to be
included so as to render the district not susceptible of identification
or, in the alternative, if the district was validly created that the elec-
tion in question was not held within its boundaries. The second
attack was based on the ground that notice of the election was not
given in a newspaper published within the confines of the school
district although such notice was published in a parish newspaper
which the school board had designated as its official journal. The
school boards in both instances interposed exceptions of no right or
cause of action and a plea of prescription pursuant to Section 14(n)
of Article XIV of the Constitution of 1921 and were upheld therein
by the court since all matters raised were deemed to be attacks on
the "validity" of the election as to which the conclusive constitu-
tional presumption is operative after the lapse of the sixty day pre-
scription period.
In a third case24 attacking the validity of a bond election, in
which suit was properly brought within the prescriptive period, the
attack was grounded on the acceptance of illegal ballots, such ille-
gality consisting of the non-qualification as an elector in the district
of one participant in the election. In view of the fact that the tax-
payer in question, although on the parish tax rolls, had not as yet
moved his family into the district and that other evidence indicated
a domicile elsewhere prior to such event, the taxpayer was held not
to be a bona fide resident within the requirements for qualified
electors.25
Authority of School Board to Lease Sixteenth Section Lands For
Agricultural Purposes
Parish school board procedures with respect to the leasing of
sixteenth section lands for agricultural purposes were brought within
the ambit of Act 170 of 1940,2" the general statute covering the leas-
ing of public lands, by a construction of that statute promulgated
23. Sansing v. Rapides Parish School Board, 81 So. (2d) 169 (La. 1947);
Browning v. Webster Parish School Board, 31 So. (2d) 621 (La. 1947).
24. McFatter v. Beauregard Parish School Board, 211 La. 443, 30 So. (*d)
197 (1947).
25. La. Act 46 of 1921 (E. S.), § 13, as amended by La. Act 281 of 1988
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8866].
26. Dart's Stats. (1989) §§ 7817-7817.10.
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by the supreme court in the case of Ellis v. Arcadia Parish School
Board"' last term.
Prior to 1940 the matter of leasing procedures had been covered
by Section 30 of Act 100 of 192228 which provided only that the
execution of the lease be approved by a resolution of the school
board. Act 170 of 1940, however, provided, with respect to leases of
all public lands by the state and its departments, agencies, subdi-
visions, and institutions, that prior to the executions of such leases
(except mineral leases for which a different procedure is provided)
a description of the land to be leased and data with respect to
making bids thereon shall be published in the official journal of
the parish where the lands are located.2"
In the instant case, the parish school board had leased land to
the plaintiff, the board having followed only the resolution pro-
cedure provided in Act 100 of 1922 without making previous
advertisement of the land. Thereafter the board was unable to put
the lessee in possession as a result of the reconduction of an existing
lease and plaintiff brought suit to recover estimated profits lost as
damgaes. The reviewing court sustained the defendant board's
exception of no right of action based on the invalidity of the lease
since execution had not been preceded by advertisement as required
by Act 170 of 1940.
In thus ruling that the earlier special statute had been partially
repealed by implication upon the passage of a general statute cover-
ing the same subject matter, the court noted that it was not thereby
going contra to the course it had pursued in State v. Humble Oil
& Refining Company.8" In that case the court was asked to con-
strue an act which vested general power to lease state lands for
mineral development in a state board "' as having the effect of strip-
ping parish school boards of their power to make leases for such
purposes of sixteenth-section lands. Refusing to put such construc-
tion upon the act, the court held that such an implied transfer of
authority with respect to sixteenth-section lands would run counter
to the constitutional dedication of the revenues from such lands to
the public schools, the later statute having made no provision for
27. 211 La. 29, 29 So. (2d) 461 (1947).
28. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2249. The portion of this section dealing with
leasing for mineral development was repealed by La. Act 162 of 1940.
29. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7317.2.
80. 195 La. 457, 197 So. 140 (1940).
81. La. Act 93 of 1936, as amended by La. Act 80 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 4725.1"-4725.21].
[Vol. Vill
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the segregation of such revenues to school purposes. 2 Here, on the
contrary, the general procedural statute, when extended to parish
school boards, would result in no transfer of power or revenues
which might conflict with the Constitution or established policy
but would effect only a substitution of improved procedures de-
signed to better safeguard the public interest in the exercise of the
leasing power. Such an effect was held to be properly achieved by
a general statute such as Act 170 of 1940 and failure to adhere to
such new procedures on the part of the school board prevented the
creation of an enforceable lease.
Lands Adjudicated to the State-Right of Homestead Entry
A somewhat ingenuous attempt to take advantage of the home-
stead laws to acquire a suburban lot which had been adjudicated
to the state for taxes was rejected by the supreme court in State ex
rel. Albeanese v. Grace."3 The lot in question had already been called
up for sale by a prospective purchaser and advertisement thereof
had been published when the relator here made application to the
Register of the State Land Office to make a homestead entry upon
the lot. The court upheld the register in a refusal to grant the
application on the ground that such a lot was not susceptible of
"settlement and cultivation" as used in the homestead act.O '
82. Such provision was made in a subsequent statute which effected the
transfer of the leasing function for mineral purposes to a state board. La. Act
162 of 1940, § 4, as amended by La. Act 338 of 1946 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 4728.4].
83. 211 La. 685, 80 So. (2d) 756 (1947).
84. La. Act 285 of 1938, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1989) § 7233.2].
